Peeling the Onion… A hidden trap for the Islamic Movement that entangled it in the games of major powers (1)

Al-Jameel Al-Fadel

 

 

This war has two sides. It wasn’t limited to being a war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Rather, it was a “strategic trap” carefully designed to peel back the layers of a deep system empowered by the Islamic Movement over decades, like an onion peeling one layer after another.

 

This particular setup exposed the fragility of the Movement, dismantled the myth of its ideological Army, and then paved the path for regional and international powers to reap the fruits.

 

However, as the Administration of Donald Trump stands on the cusp of harvesting this fruit, the question remains: Has it fully ripened, or does it still need more fire in the lab?

 

The Dream of Absolute Control

In any case, since the (1970s), the Islamic Movement, led by Hassan Al-Turabi, began putting forth efforts to attain its great dream.

 

On the program (Witness to the Era), Al-Turabi whispered confidently: “We have -already- begun sowing our seeds in the Sudanese Army.”

 

The Movement exploited the reconciliation with Jaafar en-Nimeiri in (1977) to recruit officers and train cadres. In his book, “The Islamic Movement: Circle of Light and Threads of Darkness,” Mahboub Abdel-Salam recounts.

 

By June 30th, 1989, the dream of a military coup that turned the Sudanese Army into a docile tool; was realized.

 

Holding the Reins:

Omar Al-Bashir, in the documentaries of (Al Arabiya), shared that, “The Brotherhood controls the reins of power.”

 

When Al-Turabi asked his officers to seize power, they responded with, “We hear and obey,” without question.

 

The proliferating Popular Defense Brigades, along with extensive economic networks, made the Movement impenetrable.

 

Even the glorious December Revolution, which ousted Al-Bashir, failed to shake this deep-rooted system.

 

Dr. Hassan Mekki confirmed that the Islamists hold (80%) of government positions, and Ambassador Khalid Musa stated, “Ruling without them is impossible.”

 

Nevertheless, this impregnable fortress was about to encounter an unexpected trap.

 

The Framework Is the Bait:

In December 2022, the bait was placed on the table: “The Framework Agreement,” sponsored by the Quartet (the United States, Britain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE).

 

It was a simple but deadly demand: integrate the Rapid Support Forces into the Sudanese Army within a few years and hand over power to civilians.

 

For the Islamic Movement, this was a knife pointed at the heart of its deep-rooted system.

 

The Sudanese Army is its shield, and its control over the latter is the secret to its survival.

 

Jence, its reaction was rather predictable, like someone walking into a trap: Anas Omar, an Islamist leader, threatened to “bury the Framework Agreement and those who signed it.”

 

During the (2023) Ramadan iftars, the Movement mobilized its forces and planned to wreak havoc with (60) Land Cruisers targeting the Rapid Support Forces at the Sports City.

 

However, this fire ignited successfully was the beginning of its fall into the trap.

 

Peeling the Onion:

Following the outbreak of war, the layers of the onion began to fall apart.

 

The Islamic Movement, which had expected -rather foolishly- to resolve the conflict in hours or weeks, as its cadres estimated, was confronted with a harsh reality.

 

The Rapid Support Forces took control of Khartoum, Darfur, and areas in the center of the country, seizing entire divisions, brigades, and camps.

 

Amin Hassan Omar acknowledged the loss of thousands of fighters from Al-Baraa Ibn Malik, Al-Barq Al-Khatif, and Al-Furqan Brigades, while Abdul-Hayy Youssef attempted to boast of the “Popular Resistance,” which he described as the “pet name” for Jihad, claiming that the latter, not the Sudanese Army, had achieved victories.

 

Yet, the reality was harsher: heavy human losses, the collapse of gold smuggling networks and military companies, in addition to political isolation.

 

The Spark of Escalation:

The Framework Agreement was the  sparkthat incited the escalation, and the Rapid Support Forces held out, prolonging the confrontation.

 

By July 2025, the war had extended into its third year, leaving (10 million) people displaced, whilst the country suffered through a state of economic inflation and devastation.

 

The Movement, which had adapted to priding itself on its deep-rooted system, found its entities exposed, resisting but broken.

 

Sanctions Tighten the Noose:

Last month, the United States tightened its grip on the trap with imposing new sanctions on the Port Sudan government, accusing the latter of using Chlorine Gas in (2024), as reported by the New York Times (NYT).

 

These sanctions, being part of a maximum pressure strategy, restricted exports and financing, further stifling the Sudanese Army and the Islamic Movement.

 

The Port Sudan government responded by denying the accusations, describing them as “political interference,” but the damage was done.

 

Severing ties with the (UAE) in (May 2025), over its alleged support for the Rapid Support Forces, further isolated the Movement.

 

The US sanctions also targeted Iran, which has attempted to support the Sudanese Army with drones and underground tunnels, removing an additional layer of said onion.

 

Israel in the Scene:

A Knife threatening to amputate Iran’s arm is also caught in the middle, as Israel entered the scene, concerned about Sudan’s return to the Iranian fold in the region.

 

Tel Aviv intensified its threats in (June 2025) to “amputate Iran’s arm” in Sudan.

 

The discovery of underground tunnels and Iranian-made (Matla-ul-Fajr-1 radars) on the Red Sea coast has raised concerns.

 

Israel’s attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities (Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan), with American support, have weakened Tehran, reducing its ability to support the Sudanese military.

 

However, Qeshm Fars Air flights to Port Sudan demonstrated that Iran has yet to surrender.

 

The (UAE) shares Israel’s hostility towards political Islam and Iranian influence.

 

The Harvest is Imminent:

With Donald Trump’s return to the White House last January, his Administration, through Marco Rubio and Massad Boulos, initiated attempts to reap the fruits of this trap. Rubio, during the signing session of the DRC-Rwanda Agreement, referred to Sudan, while Boulos announced a quadrilateral conference this month, with the participation of the (UAE), Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, in an effort to impose a settlement that serves American influence.

 

Is the fruit ripe enough or does it need more fire?

 

The fruit appears to be partially ripe. The Islamic Movement, which boasted of its deep-rooted system, has lost thousands of fighters, its economic resources have been depleted, and its legitimacy has deteriorated.

 

The ideologically-driven Army has become fragile, and US sanctions along with Israeli threats have constrained Iran.

 

The (UAE) and Israel, in covert coordination, prolonged the war, aiming to exhaust the Movement.

 

Nevertheless, the Movement continues to fight through “Popular Resistance.” Despite the incessant strikes, Iran continues to support the Sudanese Army.

 

Trump’s focus on Gaza and Syria, and his failure to appoint a Special Envoy for Sudan, indicate that the lab may require the addition of more fire to ripen the fruit.

 

Two Faces of War:

From optimism to disappointment, there are two faces to war: optimism at the beginning, when the Movement expected victory within hours, and disappointment at the end, with the war extended into its third year.

 

The trap, with its framework flavor, has paved the path to -successfully- peeling the onion layer by layer.

 

Trump is now on the cusp of a harvest, but the question remains: Will he reap the rewards with his own hands, or does it still need more time in the kitchen?