The Islamic State’s Call for Jihad in Sudan

“Sudan is all but Forgotten!” is the headline of this week’s editorial in (Al-Naba), the official weekly newspaper issued by the Central Media Office of the Islamic State, that highlights its global activities. In its commentary, the terrorist group’s editors explicitly call for jihad, adding that Muslims in Sudan should take up arms under the banner of the Islamic State.

Currently, the Islamic State is joining its rival (al-Qaeda) in the process of fomenting violent jihad and encouraging Sudanese individuals and groups to join its cause. Al-Qaeda first called for Sudanese jihad in late (2022), just months before the country’s ongoing civil war broke out.

“Among the -incessantly and silently- bleeding wounds are those of our persecuted brothers within the borders of forgotten Sudan, where Muslims are subjected to the most heinous crimes of murder, imprisonment, torture, violation of their honor, and theft of their money and property,” the editorial reads.

The Islamic State claims that both sides of Sudan’s brutal civil conflict are responsible for engaging in these activities, explicitly stating that “[Abdel Fattah] Al-Burhan as well as [Mohamed Hamdan Daglo] Hemedti are enemies of Islam and must therefore be opposed and declared as infidels. Hence, neither can be relied upon, regardless of the outcome of the war between them.”

Al-Burhan, who was recently sanctioned by the US Department of the Treasury, is the Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the de facto leader of Sudan. Hemedti is the Commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Following Al-Bashir’s ousting in early (2019), a civilian-military-led transitional government headed Sudan until October (2021), when the Sudanese Armed Forces removed the Civilian leadership from power and declared Military rule. Al-Burhan then sought to monopolize power and influence through the Sudanese Armed Forces under the Military regime until tensions with the Rapid Support Forces finally erupted into open bloodshed in April (2023).

The Sudanese Armed Forces has been accused of carrying out mass atrocities and gross human rights violations since the beginning of the ongoing civil war.

The two main factions in the civil war, according to the Islamic State, are “Part of the infidel world order, seeking to impose the ignorant limitations that restrict and imprison Muslims.” The editorial continues by stating that “Whoever follows the steps they have taken under the supervision of America and Saudi Arabia knows that both are fighting the Sharia and are only loyal to the Jews and Christians.”

According to the terrorist group’s commentary, the solution to restoring the honor and dignity of Muslims in Sudan is very simple: jihad. “Supporting Muslims in Sudan is a duty for every capable Muslim, as is the case in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Palestine, and elsewhere,” the editorial states. Adding, “This can only be achieved through jihad and fighting, or by spending money [to support jihad], or by encouraging [jihad].”

In addition to extolling the virtues of supporting their Muslim brothers, the Islamic State doubles down on its call to arms. “This is a message to young Muslims and Mujahidin inside Sudan to emphasize the necessity of working tirelessly to exploit the situation for the benefit of jihad, whether through recruitment or preparation, in order to create a nucleus that will confront short-term dangers and help establish a long-term army.” – the term of Jihad.

While addressing ordinary civilians, the Islamic State concludes its rant by encouraging them to convert to Islam, declare jihad, and support the Mujahideen, since, according to the global jihadist group, this is the only way to save themselves.

Working Towards Jihad in Sudan

Although the Islamic State is publicly calling for jihad inside Sudan currently, it has quietly operated in the country with a dedicated network since at least (2019)—even though recruiters and facilitators were active prior to that date. The Sudanese fighters were among the largest foreign component of the Islamic State in Libya during its height in (2016), for instance.

Sudanese authorities have previously attempted to quash the relatively small network by periodically announcing raids or arrests of the Islamic State’s members, such as in September and October of (2021), when authorities arrested more than a dozen members and killed several others across Khartoum.

Nevertheless, the Sudanese network persisted. Thus far, it doesn’t appear to be a network for attacks; rather, but a network for financing, procurement, and providing logistical support for different Islamic State wings.

The UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team reports periodically on this network. In July (2023), its report indicated that the Islamic State network in Sudan comprised between (100 and 200) individuals and was headed by veteran Iraqi jihadist Abu Bakr al-Iraqi, a blood relative of former Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Under Iraqi leadership, the network was described as a “Logistical and financial base […] through which transit and investment would take place.” The report also notes that al-Iraqi operates and maintains an array of businesses in both Sudan and Türkiye, the profits of which are used to support the Islamic State across Africa, most notably its West Africa and Sahel Provinces.

Although the UN report failed to mention this, it is likely that the network in Sudan also helps support the Islamic State’s Somalia Province, with Sudanese fighters representing a significant component of that group’s foreign fighters. The terrorist group’s Sudanese network may also assist additional wings of the Islamic State in Africa, even though such support remains unclear.

Little else is known about the Islamic State’s activities inside Sudan. However, with the group is now openly calling for jihad inside the country, hence, this network ought to be closely monitored, as it may abandon its support role in favor of an operational/attack role.

Clearly, the Islamic State already has a skeleton from which it possesses the ability to build a new so-called “Province” within the overall structure of the group. However, whether the Islamic State feels confident enough to move into open warfare in Sudan remains to be an important question. Regardless, this scenario should be considered as a real possibility.

As noted earlier, the Islamic State’s rival, (al-Qaeda), has also attempted to foment jihad inside Sudan. For example, in October (2022), Abu Hudhayfah al-Sudani, a veteran al-Qaeda member, released a pamphlet calling for and inciting jihad, providing a guide that would-be jihadists could use to form a unified group in his native Sudan.

However, so far, al-Qaeda’s call to arms appears to have come to nothing, at least publicly. Although, the group has often operated more covertly than ISIS, and may therefore have some form of clandestine cell.

It is also worth noting that Islamists are already fighting alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), particularly Al-Baraa Ibn Malik’s Brigade, and other groups within the broader “Popular Resistance” umbrella under the Military’s tutelage.

Jihadists and other Islamists have also been released during prison breaks since the beginning of the ongoing civil war. It is certainly possible that elements or individuals previously associated with (al-Qaeda) are already active and therefore active alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces – but this remains wholly unconfirmed.

Al-Qaeda has a more extensive history within the country, having been based there since the early (1990s).

The terrorist group has had various cells in Sudan over the years, such as a cell in (Salama), a suburb of Khartoum, in (2007); a cell in Dinder National Park in (2012); and two organizations, Ansar al-Tawhid and al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Niles, in the late (2000s) to early (2010s).

In recent years, (al-Qaeda) hasn’t been known to be particularly active inside Sudan. However, as Abu Hudhayfah al-Sudani’s booklet illustrates; the group clearly wishes to. Whether it will make a more concerted public effort to counter the Islamic State’s call to arms; remains to be seen.

In any case, both global jihadist organizations have now publicly called for jihad in Sudan, and the Islamic State is already known to have an active network structure inside the country. As the civil war continues—and further deteriorates into additional chaos and atrocities—these jihadists may find more opportunities to publicly align themselves and participate in the conflict.

“Caleb Weiss is an editor of FDD’s Long War Journal and a Senior Analyst at the Bridgeway Foundation, where he focuses on the spread of the Islamic State in Central Africa.”