US Report: Ideological Militias Operate Within SAF with Official Funding 

A study published by “the Gatestone Institute” offers a stark perspective on the ongoing war in Sudan, arguing that any attempt to halt the fighting or build a lasting peace will remain doomed to failure unless the deep-rooted structure established by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) within the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the ruling authority in Port Sudan is dismantled. 

This argument, based on decades of political and security analysis, serves to reignite the debate regarding the organization’s ideological role in shaping the Sudanese State, which, in turn, places the ongoing war within a broader context than simply a conflict between two armed forces. 

The study is based on a clear warning: Ignoring this role will simply reproduce the mistakes of the 1990s, when Sudan became a hub for transnational extremist networks, hosting groups that carried out deadly attacks on the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar esSalaam in (1998) and on the USS Cole in (2000), before these networks intersected with the path that led to the September 11th attacks. The purpose of recalling these particular incidents in history is not limited to highlighting a comparison, indeed, its an attempt to remind decision-makers that the environment that allowed such events to take place has yet to be completely dismantled, and that the current war could reproduce it in a new form. 

Furthermore, the study argues that the war awarded the Muslim Brotherhood with an opportunity to return to power, governing the State “through the back door,” under the guise of national defense. It states that media outlets loyal to the organization played a pivotal role in undermining ceasefire efforts, rejecting negotiations, and delegitimizing civilian alternatives by portraying the war as an existential struggle against “foreign agents” and “enemies of Islam.” The study’s author, Robert Williams, points out that the organization’s supporters have not only supported the Sudanese Army since the outbreak of war in (April 2023), but have also “infiltrated its operations, intelligence, and policies.” 

The study goes further, arguing that Sudan has become a fertile ground for extremist networks due to the organization’s external connections, coupled with the fragility of the State under the weight of war. Moreover, the study warns against dealing with the current authority in Port Sudan, which it describes as “led by an organization with a documented history of hosting Al-Qaeda, funding Hamas, cooperating with Iran, and undermining democratic transitions.” It revisits the organization’s long-standing relationship with Iran, hosting Osama bin Laden in (1991), and asserting that the current rapprochement between the two sides is not a recent development but rather an extension of shared interests. 

In addition, the published study offers a different interpretation of the nature of the war, arguing that reducing it to a confrontation between the Sudanese Army and the Rapid Support Forces “obscures a more significant reality.” For according to the study, the conflict is a new chapter in the Muslim Brotherhood’s decades-long project to dominate the Sudanese State “by force when necessary, by infiltration when possible, and through regional alliances when needed.” It describes the war as being waged on multiple fronts, but through “a single center of gravity: the Muslim Brotherhood Organization.” 

In the midst, the study indicates that networks linked to the organization mobilized thousands of former officers, Islamist cadres, and veterans, organizing them into ideological militias such as “Al-Baraa Brigade” and the “Sudan Shield.” Such units received weapons and funding through official military channels, blurring the lines between the Sudanese Army and the allied militias. The study concluded that the organization’s media platforms crafted a narrative justifying the war and providing it with religious and political cover, effectively portraying the Muslim Brotherhood as an indispensable ally in times of conflict. 

According to the aforementioned study, the establishment of the “Popular Resistance” structures, approved by Al-Burhan’s leadership, is merely an attempt to recycle the organization’s networks following the dissolution of the National Congress Party (NCP) in (2019). It argues that the war allowed these networks to return to the State “through the back door,” echoing the strategy of the 1990s when Sudan became a global hub for transnational jihad. 

In short, the study indicated that the Muslim Brotherhood is not an external force influencing Al-Burhan’s regime, but rather its “ideological and organizational backbone.” Hence, the study explains that the organization’s branches provide fighters, militias, and intelligence expertise, whilst Al-Burhan’s leadership provides legitimacy, weapons, and access to State institutions —a “deal” reminiscent of the one that sustained Al-Bashir’s rule in the 1990s. “This alliance explains why international pressure to initiate negotiations has failed. As any genuine transition to civilian rule would -in turn- dismantle the Brotherhood’s reconstituted power structure, something the current regime cannot tolerate,” according to Williams. 

In which sense, the study argues that peace in Sudan necessitates far more than military arrangements or political understandings, rather, its a matter of dismantling an ideological structure deeply entrenched within the State. This perspective, regardless of differing interpretations, raises a fundamental question: Can Sudan overcome the war without redefining the relationship between the government, the military, and the organizations that have been part of the State’s fabric for decades?