Contemplation of the Sudanese Illusion’s Geopolitics

 Dr. Al-Waleed Adam Madbou

“There are no morals in politics, only balances. Nevertheless, lacking the latter personally and then complaining about the imbalance, is rather disastrous.” 

 — Mohamed Hassanein Heikal

Whoever chooses to read Dr. Al-Nour Hamad’s recent book, “Egyptian Hegemony over Sudan: The Last Cry Before Devourment,” in addition to the subsequent articles by Professor Rasha Awad and others, will soon realize that the idea of ​​an “Egyptian Conspiracy” against Sudan is no longer an intellectual luxury. It has become an explanatory narrative for a significant number of our chronic crises.

Al-Nour Hamad argues that Cairo was not content with subjugating Sudan, but sought to exploit it, if not enslave it. Furthermore, its project, since the Turkish era, has been based on this imperialist approach. This idea, while attractive in its wording and coherent in its narrative, raises a deeper question: “Are we truly victims of the conspiracies of others, or mere prisoners of our own impotence?”

Realistically, I don’t disagree with Al-Nour or Rasha in their diagnosis of Egyptian behavior towards Sudan, nonetheless, I’ve a different opinion in terms of perspective, for international relations, as Kissinger said, “are not managed by good intentions but by an assessment of interests.” When we insist on placing ourselves in the victim category, we absolve ourselves of the burden of strategic thinking and abdicate our historical responsibility for shaping our destiny. States are not managed by the logic of charitable organizations, but by the logic of Manichaean conflicts: forces compete, interests intersect, and those without a set project become the project of others.

The problem lies -not- with the Egyptians. Egypt, as we know it today, is not a free-willed State so much as it is hostage to its military establishment, which has transformed from it’s inherent as a guardian of the State into its owner. This establishment, which possesses a psychological and political makeup that resembles its Sudanese counterpart, is bound to it by an old “oligarchic” relationship based on the exchange of loyalties and benefits, not on an exchange of visions and interests.

Essentially, Egypt, at this moment, is no longer the regional power that once frightened others. It has been reduced to a shrinking State, with its ambitions declining from leading the Arab world to protecting its own internal order. Moreover, its suffering from a profound economic collapse and apparent institutional decay. Yet it stubbornly retains something we seem to lack: a central self-awareness, albeit a false one. Yet we dare not expose it, as we are a nation without leaders, a State without a project, a national army, a professional diplomacy, or a clear idea of ​​what we aim to become.

The problem lies within us. It lies within our politicians, who have become so enamored with our Levantine identity that they have become absorbed in its rhetoric at the expense of their authentic African affiliation. It lies within our disdain for our Negro selves, our denial of our Kushite civilization and the origins of our human renaissance. It lies within our military elites, who continue to display an unfortunate lack of a national vision to rescue them from the captivity of colonial history. Thus, our economy remains hostage to the logic of crude exports and imported consumption. In the absence of a diplomatic cadre capable of transitioning from “salon diplomacy” to trade and investment diplomacy, and from reactions to forming positions. 

We have long failed to formulate a comprehensive national project that would make Sudan a solid entity whose fronts cannot be easily penetrated. We have been preoccupied with the Palestinian cause at the expense of our existential issues: the South, the Nuba, the Nubians, the non-Arabs, in addition to the Hamitic people of Eastern Sudan. Not only that, but our military and civilian elites have relied on the Nasserist and Baathist arsenals to suppress the marginalized.

Hence, the enemy found its prey in us, and when the opportunity arose, it did not hesitate to sabotage our economy and destroy our infrastructure. Worse still, it has recently exploited its platforms to target our valleys and direct drones deep into our territory.

Today, Sudan is no longer limited to being a troubled country, instead it transformed into an arena of international competition, where major interests intersect. The United States views it as a pillar for reengineering the Horn of Africa and ensuring security in the Red Sea. Russia seeks to utilize it to gain a foothold in warm ports. Türkiye is searching rather desperately for its lost Ottoman legacy, whilst Iran is searching for a way out of its isolation.

Egypt, on the other hand, views Sudan’s stability or collapse as a security equation that concerns its own survival, not its neighbor’s.

Hence, Sudan has now become an arena for intelligence and diplomatic conflict that will ultimately be resolved by an American decision or a broad international understanding. Until then, we ought to be realistic, not emotional, and refrain from adopting the emotional rhetoric that will only serve to blur our vision. For politics —as some describe it— is “the art of the possible,” and the possible, in our case, is built solely through the ability to maneuver, not by lamenting idealism.

The first step towards achieving true independence is to face the truth as it is: that Sudan will not succeed in achieving renaissance through displaying hostility towards Egypt or by relying on others, but rather by building itself and regaining its self-confidence. When we reformulate our national project based on self-interest, realism, and dignity, we can engage with Cairo, and the entire world, from a position of equals, not subservience.

In conclusion, the Sudanese illusion’s geopolitics is by no means limited to a story about Egypt, but about us: about an elite intoxicated by myths, about a homeland that forgot itself while dreaming of another. For there is no point in reiterating that Egypt colonized Sudan or obstructed the possibility of a democratic civil transition —that is a given— rather, we ought to prove that Sudan is capable of liberating itself from its illusions and addressing the causes of its own impotence.

Within the context of international relations, issues are not managed by principles, but by interests, and these interests can only be seized through competence and wisdom, not by force or emotion. The world fails to respect the weak or the complainers; it respects those who possess the capacity for taking action and demonstrating a clear interest.