What awaits the government of Tasis ..!?

 Concerns on the horizon of differences 

Abdul Hafeez Maryoud 

Previously, I stated that the (April 15th, 2023) war presents new grounds for the practice of violence and politics in Sudan, because it ignited battles in areas not previously included in the map of conventional wars. It expanded the scope of those directly affected by the war and brought in groups and segments that had never considered taking up arms and fighting. For in reality, Sudan’s general memory preserves geographical “margins of war” since independence: South Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, Darfur, the Blue Nile, in addition to the eastern borders. You can sit in a comfortable chair in the Republican Palace, as did the son of Mohammed Osman Al-Mirghani, the day after his appointment as President Al-Bashir’s assistant, and announce to the Sudanese people that you are putting forth efforts to stop the war in the (White Nile and North Kordofan). As there is no need to be meticulously acquainted with the “geographical margins of war.” It is sufficient to possess basic knowledge about a distant war, with flames that would never be able to singe the edges of your cloak.

Literature and political traditions are preserved well: mediation takes place after years of war. The “government” —regardless of which government it is— negotiates with the “rebels.” An agreement is signed that guarantees nominal power-sharing and a partial share of resources, and then everything ends.

Do you see ?

However, this time, the war has left no place untouched. Even as the Rapid Support Forces’ human expansion in central Sudan, its southeastern borders, and the borders of the River Nile state receded, Khartoum’s drones began to strike —like a flash of lightning, almost blinding— cities like Port Sudan, Dongola, Merowe, Kassala, El-Gedaref, etc. Which, until those strikes took place, believed they were impregnable and immune. Furthermore, the aforementioned is an issue no one can definitively promise to curb or even control, that is, if accelerated development wasn’t a foregone conclusion.

Politically:

The forces supporting the Rapid Support Forces established a broad Alliance; the Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasis), from which emerged a government with its capital in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur state. The Alliance attracted the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), Al-Hilu’s faction, and even contributed to shaping its future. The Alliance appointed Al-Hilu as Vice President of the Presidential Council. Which is a completely new experience in the context of conventional warfare and political practice in modern Sudan. For the opposition experiences in Sudan have -so far- only managed to reach a stage of unity, convergence of visions, and -consequent- continued armed as well as civil action to “overthrow the regime.” Hence, forming a government that has no obsession with competing for legitimacy or overthrowing the regime is a new experience.

Do you see ?

Apart from the cynicism, apathy, repressed pain, and limited imagination of the Islamists in the “war to return to power” they ignited, what awaits the government of Tasis..!?

It is rather clear that the government of (Tasis) controls extensive borders with Sudan’s neighbors: Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic, 90% of the borders with South Sudan, in addition to the borders with Ethiopia and Egypt, across the Triangle. It controls the production areas of many of Sudan’s main export commodities (gum arabic, oil, oilseeds, livestock), in addition to fertile agricultural lands and minerals, including uranium, in North Darfur. It does not lack manpower or skilled personnel. It also maintains regional and international relations that are open to expansion and recognition, under the rule of mutual interests and benefits that govern international relations. This glimpse does not necessarily mean that the Sudan Founding Alliance’s government is bent on implementing a secession project, as promoted by the “Blabsa,” nor does it imply such a sentiment in any of its documents, practices, or intentions. Its a government of peace and unity, as it has presented itself, putting forth efforts to paint the roadmap of a unified Sudan.

Therefore, one of the first priorities of the Alliance’s government is to guard against falling into the traps and snares of the Islamists who control Al-Burhan and his Army. These traps involve the competition for legitimacy, not only regionally and internationally, but also domestically. The Port Sudan government will portray the situation as a scramble for legitimacy, and that it -alone- possesses it, using official documents, currency, the educational process, and seals. Port Sudan will also, as it always does, utilize the internal conflicts. It will scheme on a tribal level, use the entitlement to represent, govern, and land relations in the communities of Kordofan and Darfur.

This will appear to be a contest for legitimacy, a threshold the “founders” ought to have crossed. Basic services are not the sole focus of governance. Proving legitimacy and providing services to citizens will be the biggest trap. Nevertheless, changing the structure of consciousness is the horizon that Tasis ought to focus on.

Do you see ?

What does it mean for a government to focus on changing the “structure of consciousness”?

Is this -simply- an intellectual observation?

Of course not.

There are visions and conceptual limits for the collective consciousness of the Sudanese people, as throughout their history, they have allowed deadly projects to be disguised in elegant garb. And it is precisely these limitations that have rendered it crippled in terms of learning and producing change. Over the past thirty-two years, the Salvation (Inqaz) Government has played a prominent role in widening the gaps in this societal consciousness, such that mending and repairing them has become far more important than: Who governs? How do they govern? And why?

I believe that is a horizon worth aspiring to attain.

Isn’t that right?