Following the failure of Akinci… Türkiye increases its support for Islamist militias in Sudan with YIHA drones

In a significant military escalation, private sources revealed to (Alrakoba) that Türkiye has begun supplying Islamist brigades allied with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) with suicide drones, known locally as (YIHA). This particular  development represents a strategic shift following the field failure of the advanced (Bayraktar Akinci) drones in achieving decisive results against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which -in turn- reinforces fears of Ankara’s decision to adopt a strategy of deeper involvement in the Sudanese conflict in an effort to support its Islamist allies.

From the Akinci’s Failure to Cheap War Tactics:

Sudanese military sources reported that the (Bayraktar Akinci) drones, despite their high technical capabilities and high-altitude flight, failed to destroy strategic targets of the Rapid Support Forces, such as radar and air defense systems. This failure is attributed to the difficulty of accurately identifying targets in the face of the adversary’s camouflage and deployment tactics.

Hence, this operational incompetence prompted Ankara’s allies in Port Sudan to request alternative weapons that were less expensive and more flexible, capable of waging a war of attrition and creating chaos. The response came in the form of (YIHA) suicide drones, which achieve significant psychological and media impact at a low operational cost.

What Are The (YIHA) Suicide Drones?

(YIHA) isn’t an official name for a military product; rather, its a local term for “Loitering Munitions,” the latter are drones that hover over a target area for a period of time before swooping down and exploding.

Turkish companies such as (STM) produce similar models (the KARGU and ALPAGU models), both have been used in previous conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Azerbaijan. However, their danger in Sudan lies in the nature of their use, as evidence indicates that they are frequently directed at civilian targets and infrastructure with the aim of terrorizing the population and subduing any area that dares to resist.

 

Double the Impact: Civilian Casualties and Industrial Reputation at Stake:

The aforementioned drones are easy to launch and don’t require complex infrastructure or advanced training, making them an ideal weapon for a “dirty war.” Eyewitnesses in Khartoum and El-Obeid documented small drones with a distinctive sound falling over homes and residential areas, resulting in civilian casualties and creating an atmosphere of terror.

On the other hand, this field failure of advanced Turkish drones has begun to negatively impact the reputation of the Turkish defense industry. Baykar, which marketed the Akinci as a stealth drone, now faces skepticism about the effectiveness of its products in complex combat environments like Sudan, threatening the confidence of international customers.

Public Political Support and Potential International Repercussions:

Recently, the supply of these weapons is seen as part of a broader Turkish strategy to support political Islamist forces in the region and secure influence in the Red Sea. Data indicates that the Islamic Group, which controls decision-making in Port Sudan, received this support in direct coordination with Ankara.

This involvement has raised growing international concern. Western and Arab capitals have begun closely monitoring the Turkish role, and reports indicate that Turkish arms exports may be subject to renewed review, especially with the documentation of their use in targeting civilians. In this context, international human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International (AI), have called for an immediate investigation to determine the source of these drones and hold accountable those responsible for their use against civilians.

In conclusion, it appears that Turkish support has transformed from tactical support to the direct provision of lethal technologies used without restraint, with the (YIHA) suicide drones becoming a symbol of a new and bloody phase of the war. Which begs the question: How long will the international community remain silent whilst Sudan becomes an open testing ground for suicide drones.!?