The Founding Alliance Criticized: From the discourse of injustice to assuming responsibility
Khaled Fadl
The majority of the principles contained in the Founding Charter concern, in one way or another, the democratic civil forces and Armed Struggle Movements in the south, east, and west of the country. They were also included in the principles of the famous Asmara Declaration of (1995), a project adopted by the National Democratic Alliance forces (NDA) at the time.
Some points were clearly and explicitly formulated, such as the stipulation of a secular and federal State, the establishment of supra-constitutional principles that are not subject to amendment, and the linking of the “Founding” project to the right of self-determination of the Sudanese people. This is a feature of the project; voluntary unity is the foundation for building the nation-State.
An objective observer of this particular Charter will be able to see in it a final glimmer of hope and a step towards building a social contract that has been missing since the country’s independence. It is a formula for exploring the possibility of voluntary coexistence based on common interests. As in Sudan, even though it has now collapsed; its citizens weren’t organized into a social contract or a voluntary national project that accommodated them with justice and freedom. Therefore, a society of peace, brotherhood, freedom, and equality failed to emerge. Rather, gaps deepened, and the State structure continued to erode as a result of bias, corruption, and favoritism.
In the eyes of many, the State has become a malicious center, subject to blackmail, weaving conspiracies in an effort to perpetuate the influence and dominance of specific parties and ethnic groups. In consequence, a comprehensive discourse of grievance has emerged across most parts of the country, instead of massive development projects that can improve people’s lives. Hence, its not at all surprising that hate speech and its practice prevail in the midst of the ongoing war. As the comprehensive war that struck the center revealed, for the first time, the true fragile state plaguing society in Sudan. Regionalism, racism, and tribalism were the refuges to which people resorted in times of distress. The remnants of State institutions only emerged as part of these social systems, narrower than the supposed spaciousness of the State. Its no surprise that the Sudanese Army established and sponsored tribal, regional, and ideological militias. A number of measures and decisions were taken and implemented based on the concepts of fragmentation and division, as occurred with secondary school exams, the currency exchange, and other measures specific to certain regions of Sudan, excluding large areas from it. Courts tried some citizens on charges of collaborating with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which, until the morning of (April 15th), was part of the Military/Security apparatus of the same State. The flight of citizens in opposite directions as the Sudanese Army and its allied militias, or the Rapid Support Forces, advanced also reflects societies’ perception of the warring forces as regionally or ethnically biased. For how could these two forces constitute the foundation of the supposed national military institution, according to the leaders of the dysfunctional State and the leaders of the so-called national Army? The war exposed these illusions and Sudanese citizens learned the nature of the State that had oppressed them since independence.
Building the State on the foundations of true federalism, enabling each region to express its social components and benefit from its resources based on the theory of integration, not conflict, and on the concept of mutual interests, not plunder of resources, all in a manner that will enable the capital to be limited to becoming a de facto center for the symbolism of national Sovereignty and coordination. This model will resolve the tensions resulting from central control, the main levers of which have remained monopolized by specific regional, ethnic, and organizational groups. Perhaps the long experience of Islamist rule has fully exposed the foundations of the system of hegemony that has prevailed in the country. It has also revealed the racist and regional tendencies in the State structure and its inferior biases. Therefore, the “Founding” project gains its objectivity by addressing these errors with extreme clarity and frankness, and by making the nature of the State a condition for its establishment.
The challenge facing the Sudan Founding Alliance lies in assuming responsibility, as defined by the provisions. This means that the stated goal ought to have a visible material counterpart, and that is the real test, not the superficial appearance of Hemedti as President, Al-Hilu as Vice-President, so-and-so as Minister, and so-and-so as Spokesperson. The background of the signatories to the Charter and the political, intellectual, and professional figures who participated in its preparation —all of whom represent diverse viewpoints as well as ethnic, regional, and tribal differences— is truly a strength of this thesis. For the essence of Sudan is pluralism in all its forms, and what is always missing is how to manage this pluralism with wisdom and prudence. The longing to build a true State owned by the Sudanese people, with all their diversity, begins in their villages, their sects, and their urban neighborhoods. This dream State is a focus of hope and optimism, as it dispels concerns about marginalization and the discourse of victimhood by implementing true federalism in a democratic State.
I, for one, am well aware that the task of establishing the desired State is the duty of everyone who believes in the necessity of change and seeks to implement it. The greatest possible national consensus is the path to achieving this goal. I hope its clear that the individual is the true goal of this struggle and endeavor to build a State. Therefore, the responsibility of the “founders” is doubled in an effort to provide a well-received model for what they state in writing. As the aforementioned will motivate the hesitant and reserved, and it will destabilize and weaken the positions of those who reject it as well. Will the “Founding” Alliance succeed in this test, or will it only amount to a repetition of the numerous scenarios that have been tried and failed, and thus this country will cease to exist and become -God forbid- “what used to be called Sudan,” since the factors of disintegration and fragmentation prevailed, and the people reverted to the era of sultanates, mini-states, Mak and sheikhdoms?
