The Army, Islamists, and Iran

Abdel Moneim Suleiman

At a time when Sudan is bleeding from the open wounds of a brutal internal war, it finds itself once again at the heart of an explosive regional conflict.

Not only by the decision of a hijacked military group, but also by narrow-minded ideological Sudanese forces controlling the de facto authority in Port Sudan. They have hijacked political and military decisions, plunging the country into an international game involving major players, the consequences of which Sudan cannot bear.

Following the outbreak of the armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Force (SAF), led by Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Daglo (Hemedti), Iran has re-established itself as a party to the conflict, providing military support to strengthen its historical ties with the Islamist wing within the military establishment, known as “Al-Kizan.”

This support wasn’t merely a fleeting ideological solidarity; it took more concrete forms: Iranian cargo aircraft belonging to “Qeshm Fars” Airlines landed at Port Sudan Airport, day and night, carrying shipments of weapons and drones, accompanied by experts from the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who operated the drone systems and trained Sudanese personnel in that field.

Such frivolous behavior from the Islamic Movement comes at a time when another front in the Middle East is flaring up, with Tel Aviv and Tehran exchanging inflammatory statements across multiple arenas: from Syria to the Red Sea, via Yemen and Gaza, and now to Sudan. This suggests that Tehran’s choice of Sudan as a forward foothold was not arbitrary, but rather part of a calculated strategy exploiting a geopolitical vacuum and internal rift to consolidate its presence on the Red Sea shore.

On the other hand, this Iranian expansion cannot be separated from the Israeli security prospect. Tel Aviv views any act of strengthening the Iranian presence in the Red Sea as a direct threat to its national security, especially if coupled with the drone capabilities already in the hands of extremist organizations, such as Al-Baraa Ibn Malik Brigades, the most powerful military wing of the Islamic Movement in its war in Sudan.
From this perspective, previous Israeli intelligence operations deep inside Sudan and the devastating raids in (2012) targeting smugglers and convoys transporting Iranian weapons through Sudan to Gaza can be understood.

Sudan, in that case, is not limited to fighting an internal war; rather, its gradually becoming a testing ground for the struggle between major regional powers. The Islamists (Al-Kizan), through the Sudanese Army, although they are confronting the Rapid Support Forces, are relying on an Iranian crutch, in an equation that could reproduce the Syrian model with a Sudanese flavor. Herein lies the danger of the undeclared internationalization of the conflict and of Sudan becoming leverage in Iran’s hands, deployed as part of its array of regional threats against Israel and its allies.

In light of this complex landscape, the most pressing question remains: Can Sudan bear the consequences of this alignment? Do local actors realize that they have become pawns on a chessboard being tossed about by the major players? What appeared to be an “Islamist” war for power could soon turn into a proxy war, draining what remains of the Sudanese Atate’s fabric.

Furthermore, because the country shouldnot be a testing ground for ideologies, nor a theater for others’ conflicts; saving Sudan today begins with besieging the Islamic Movement, severing its ties to the military and security apparatus, and reclaiming national decision-making power from the grip of those aspiring to attain a false sense of internationalism, built on the ruins of the nation.